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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses CPLR section 302(a)(1) as applied by the
New York State Court of Appeals in Paterno v. Laser Spine
Institute.1 The Paterno Court failed to properly apply a statutory
jurisdictional analysis by conflating it with a due process inquiry. 2
Also, the Court unnecessarily balanced the interests of the Empire
State's citizens in having a forum for access to justice with
unjustified policy fears of potential costs to the state from assertions
of in personam jurisdiction. 3 Furthermore, the Court's policy focus 4
on the protection of medical doctors from lawsuits 5 and the
prevention of "floodgate" litigation which would adversely affect the
medical profession was not justified by the record and created poor
precedent for subsequent judicial application of the state's long-arm
statute.6
This article will examine CPLR section 302(a)(1), under Paterno
v. Laser Spine Institute and some of its predecessors, to demonstrate
that sometimes overarching policy concerns get in the way of a
strict statutory analysis under CPLR section 302(a)(1). 7 We analyze
1 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 990 (N.Y. 2014); 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE CPLR 302.00, at 3-42 (David L. Ferstendig ed., LexisNexis Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 2015). As noted in the Historical Appendix to New York Civil Practice CPLR,
"[w]e have seen slow but steady development of New York's long-arm power." WEINSTEIN ET
AL. at 302 App.02, at 3-113.
2 See Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 996.
3 See id. at 992.
1 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) (McKinney 2016); Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 995.
See, e.g., Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 995; Etra v. Matta, 463 N.E.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
that CPLR 302(a)(1) did not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state doctor in medical
malpractice action arising from that doctor's treatment of plaintiffs' decedent); O'Brien v.
Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 760 N.Y.S.2d 425, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (first citing
Hermann v. Sharon Hosp., 522 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582-83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); and then citing
Carte v. Parkoff, 543 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)) (declining to extend long-arm
jurisdiction to cover out-of-state medical centers where the contacts were limited or the injury
occurred outside of New York); Hermann, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83 (holding that the CPLR did
not confer personal jurisdiction over a Connecticut hospital in a New York plaintiffs medical
malpractice action arising from injuries sustained in the course of medical treatment at the
hospital).
6 After having a lengthy discussion with retired Justice of the Appellate Division, Second
Department Daniel Angiolillo, Jurist in Residence at Pace University School of Law, he made
clear that opening the "floodgates" to litigation with nondomiciliary doctors would negatively
affect the medical profession. See Black v. Oberle Rentals, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1967) ("In other words, CPLR [Section 302(a)(3)] looks to the imparting of the original
injury within the State of New York and not resultant damage, in order that jurisdiction
might be effectuated. To hold otherwise would open a veritable Pandora's box of litigation
subjecting every conceivable prospective defendant involved in an accident with a New York
domiciliary to defend actions brought against them in the State of New York.").
7 Id. at 990; see infra Parts VI-VIII.
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how the Court of Appeals in Paterno conflated the jurisdictional
basis and due process analyses and determine that the Court, based
on a faulty statutory analysis, erroneously decided that there was
no statutory jurisdiction.8
Our article is divided into six parts. Part II briefly discusses the
history of the CPLR and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction
through Sections 301 and 302, focusing mainly on long-arm
jurisdiction. Part III discusses and analyzes leading cases, which
involve the application of CPLR 302 in obtaining personal
jurisdiction. Part IV discusses a recent case, Paterno v. Laser Spine
Institute, in great detail, and Part V engages in a critical analysis of
Paterno with reference to a similar case, Grimaldi v. Guinn.9 Part
VI addresses policy considerations and Part VII concludes with a
discussion of how the Paterno Court entangled its jurisdictional
analysis and where the Court may be headed with its future
application of CPLR section 302(a)(1).
II. JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK
The CPLR is over fifty years old 10 and is recognized as one of the
oldest state procedural codes.'1 As such, it is important to review
its history and discuss, throughout this paper, how the rules
continue to evolve and develop.
Under the CPLR, a New York State court cannot render a valid,
binding judgment without jurisdiction. 12  Until the nineteenth
century, the prevailing doctrine held that due process did not
permit state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries and foreign corporations unless they were present
8 See infra Parts VII-VIII.
9 Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
10 Jay C. Carlisle, Happy Anniversary to the CPLR: A Joint Achievement of the Practicing
Bar and the Academy, 85 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J. 18, 18 (2013). The CPLR is a production of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, which was appointed in 1955 by the New
York State Temporary Commission on the Courts. Id. This project involved thousands of
hours of research, hearings, draft reports, debate and consultation of the practicing bar and
academy, and revisions. Id.
1 Id. at 21 (discussing the history and application of the CPLR in New York).
12 See, e.g., Kagen v. Kagen, 236 N.E.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. 1968) (discussing whether the
Queens County Supreme Court had jurisdiction to render a binding judgment in the case
before the court); WEISNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.00, 3-43; Jay C. Carlisle, Recent
Jurisdiction Developments in the New York Court of Appeals, 29 PACE L. REV. 417, 418 (2009)
("Jurisdiction consists of subject matter jurisdiction (competence to entertain a claim or
claims), in personam jurisdiction (power over the person or property), and proper notice.").
We will focus only on in personam jurisdiction in this article.
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within the state at the time of the commencement of the action.13
The law on jurisdiction has since changed and expanded as
interstate travel increased and technology progressed. 14
A. General Jurisdiction under CPLR 301
If a defendant consents, is domiciled, incorporated, or licensed to
do business in New York, a New York court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over that defendant. 15 Jurisdiction over the property of
a defendant includes both in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.16 In
rem jurisdiction occurs when the litigation involves property within
the territorial boundaries in New York.17 Quasi in rem jurisdiction
occurs when a non-domiciliary's property within the State is
attached to obtain a ground for jurisdiction in a cause of action not
directly related to the property.18  These traditional bases of
jurisdiction are referred to as general jurisdiction and are
incorporated in CPLR 301.19 The 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Daimler AG v. Bauman20 limits general jurisdiction in New York
to the state of incorporation, the state where the corporation has its
principal place of business or to certain "exceptional
circumstances" matters. It seems clear that the broad general
jurisdiction of CPLR 301 permitted under Tauza and its progeny is
no longer constitutionally permitted in New York. Since Daimler
has no direct relevancy to CPLR 302, we chose not to discuss its
implications to assertions of long arm jurisdiction in this article.
B. Long-Arm Jurisdiction under CPLR 302
Modeled after section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,21 CPLR
302 defines when courts have personal jurisdiction by acts of non-
domiciliaries.22
13 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 724, 727 (1877) (holding no state can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory).
4 See infra Parts III-V.
15 See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 80-82, at 138-43 (4th ed. 2005) (giving an
overview of jurisdiction and discussing different grounds for achieving in personam
jurisdiction); WEINSTEIN ETAL., supra note 1, at 301.00, at 3-5, 3-6.
16 SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 101, at 179.
17 Id.
18 Id. at § 101, at 179-80.
19 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 2016); WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 301.00, at
3-5, 3-6.
20 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (U.S. 2014).
21 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.03, at 3-54.
22 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a).
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[B]ut unlike that [Illinois] act, which has been interpreted to
"reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-
process clause," the legislative and judicial history of CPLR
302 indicates that New York's long arm statute was not
initially designed to "confer the full complement of personal
jurisdiction constitutionally permitted."23
CPLR 302 is referred to as specific jurisdiction.
Specific jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302, permits courts to
assert long-arm jurisdiction over non-domiciliary individuals and
corporations that are not subject to general jurisdiction.24 CPLR
section 302(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in
person or through an agent: transacts any business within
the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services
in the state .... 25
Jurisdiction is determined by a three-step process. 26  First,
assuming the court has subject matter jurisdiction, the court
determines whether the plaintiffs service of process upon the
defendant was proper.27 Second, the court determines whether
there is a statutory basis under CPLR 301 or 302 that renders
service effective. 28 Third, the court determines whether the exercise
23 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.03, at 3-54-3-55 (discussing the scope of CPLR
302); Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46 (N.Y. 1988) ("These protections are
further amplified by New York's long-arm statute, which does not confer jurisdiction in every
case where it is constitutionally permissible."); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 80 (N.Y. 1965) (stating that the expansion of the scope of
permissible jurisdiction should be decided by the legislature); SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE,
supra note 15, § 84, at 145.
24 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.04, at 3-57 (discussing the reach of long-arm
jurisdiction). Jurisdiction under CPLR 302 is restricted to the contacts enumerated in the
statute, and the claim over which jurisdiction is asserted must arise out of those contacts. Id.
25 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) (emphasis added).
26 Jay C. Carlisle, Seeking Justice in the Empire State: Court of Appeals Broadens the
Reach of Long Arm Jurisdiction and Clarifies the Statutory Guidelines for Application of
CPLR Section 302(a)(1), 77 ALB. L. REV 89, 89, 91-92 (2014) (discussing the developments of
long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and analyzing the recent New York State Court
of Appeal's decision in Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327
(2012)).
27 See 1 CIvIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK § 9:2 (Philip M. Halpern et. al., eds.,
2000) (providing a comprehensive coverage, supported by current statutory and case law, and
practical experience on the area of civil pretrial practice, including jurisdiction).
28 See id. at §§ 9:3, 9:4.
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of in personam jurisdiction complies with the constitutional
mandate of fairness. 29 But, in cases of specific jurisdiction, only if
there is a statutory basis must the court then decide if jurisdiction
is permitted under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.30
The concept of long-arm jurisdiction derives from the existence of
a statute which authorizes it.31 Many state statutes, including New
York's long-arm statute, contain a list of specific state-directed
activities that permit the assertion of in personam jurisdiction only
if the particular claim arises from one of the enumerated forms of
activity. 32 Jurisdiction is a fact-based determination. 33 It "depends
on facts quite distinct from the merits of the controversy."34  As
such, it is necessary to separate the facts, which have jurisdictional
significance from those, which bear only upon the merits. 35 In
personam jurisdiction must be analyzed separately for each cause of
action. 36
Because, as mentioned previously, the statute does not reach
constitutional limits, the statutory analysis under CPLR 302 can
sometimes resemble that of a due process analysis 37 under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 38  In other words, the court may
incorrectly place more weight on the Due Process analysis than on
29 See id. at § 9:1 (describing the traditional twin requirements of fairness: notice and
opportunity to be heard).
- Carlisle, supra note 26, at 93.
31 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.01, at 3-46.
32 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2016).
33 See Adolph Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 61, 84 (1966) (discussing the origins and application of the long-
arm statute).
3 Id.
35 See id.
36 Jay C. Carlisle, Second Circuit 2000-2001 Personal Jurisdiction Developments, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 15, 17 (2001) (reviewing district and circuit court cases and commenting
on the future trends of law on personal jurisdiction in the Second Circuit).
37 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476-77 (1985) (citing World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 297 (1980)) (explaining that a due
process analysis requires a determination by the court as to whether it is fair to hail the
defendant into court. Some factors that must be balanced to determine fairness are: the
forum's interest in the litigation, the plaintiffs interest in efficient and convenient relief, the
demands of the federal system as a whole, the best interests of the federal system, and the
defendant's interest in not having to defend a suit in a remote or disadvantageous forum.).
38 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 241 (1958); Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490
F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007) ("New York decisions thus, at least in their rhetoric, tend to
conflate the long-arm statutory and constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional
standard .... ); McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 229 N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1967);
Carlisle, supra note 26, at 92 ('"Thus, sometimes a court's statutory analysis under CPLR 302
may resemble the due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment leading to an
entanglement in New York decisional jurisprudence.').
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the statutory basis analysis: "[e]xcessive emphasis on the federal
Due Process Clause has obstructed and distorted the statutory
inquiry of CPLR section 302(a)(1) by New York State and federal
courts." 39  This entangled analysis, thus, may lead to a faulty
jurisdictional analysis, 40 and inconsistent judicial decisions. 41 As
such, this conflation has produced a body of confusing precedent
and frustrated the aforementioned legislative intent of the CPLR's
drafters. 42
"While New York has not pushed an assertion of jurisdictional
power to the Constitution's outer bounds as set by the Supreme
Court, the legislature, on occasion, has shown a willingness to
target identifiable problems and expand CPLR 302 to meet them."43
It has thus become a "single contact" long-arm statute.44  For
example, a 1979 amendment to CPLR section 302(a)(1) 45 expanded
the "transaction of business" concept to allow New York courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who contracts
outside New York to supply goods or services in New York, even if
the contract is breached before the goods are ever shipped into, or
the services performed in, New York.46 As we see, New York's long-
arm statute was designed to take advantage of the minimum
contacts approach to jurisdiction outlined in International Shoe v.
Washington.47
39 Carlisle, supra note 26, at 108.
40 See id. at 92.
41 See Homburger, supra note 33, at 85.
42 See, e.g., Fischbarg v. Douchet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 24, 30 (N.Y. 2007); Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 507, 508 (N.Y. 1970) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945)).
43 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.03, at 3-56.
44 See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (reinforcing the single act
concept a few years after International Shoe when the Court held that due process was
sufficiently satisfied where there was a single contract, which had "substantial connection
with that state"); George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551, 551, 554 (N.Y. 1977)
(upholding jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1) over a salesman who had come into New
York once to negotiate an employment agreement with the plaintiff-employer); Hi Fashion
Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc., 300 N.E.2d 421, 421-22, 423 (N.Y. 1973)
(holding a guaranty signed by a nondomiciliary, but delivered to New York, was a purposeful
act that was an essential condition of the contract, which had significant New York
implications); Parke-Bernet Galleries, 256 N.E.2d at 508 ("CPLR 302 is a single-act statute
requiring but one transaction-albeit a purposeful transaction-to confer jurisdiction in New
York.").
45 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) (McKinney 2016) (coming into effect September 1, 1979,
amended paragraph 1 of subdivision (a) expanded the "transaction of business" contact to
include the situation where one "contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state").
46 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 75 (N.Y.
1965) (noting that a single transaction in New York may be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction
under CPLR section 302(a)(1)).
47 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a); Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. International Shoe Co. stated a
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1. CPLR 302(a)(1) and the "Arising out of' Requirement
By requiring that the cause of action arise from an enumerated
act, the Court of Appeals has imposed a requirement of
demonstrating an "articulable nexus." "There is no bright-line test
for determining whether [an articulable] nexus is present in a
particular case."48 The "inquiry is a fact-specific one"49 and must be
analyzed separately for each cause of action.50 The Court of Appeals
has defined the required nexus as "a substantial relationship to the
transaction out of which the instant cause of action arose."51 The
Second Circuit has characterized the nexus as '''a direct relation
between the cause of action and the in-state conduct."'52 However,
unless the cause of action is based upon some breach of contract, the
courts have been reluctant to find a nexus.53 The "arising from"
prong of the CPLR section 302(a)(1) essentially limits the broader
"transaction of business" prong by restricting jurisdiction to claims
connected in a meaningful way to the business transacted in New
York. 54
Causation itself, however, is not required, but rather is
permissive. 55 In expanding the "arising out of' requirement, the
Licci court intimated that CPLR section 302(a)(1) "does not require
that every element of the cause of action pleaded must relate to the
new analysis to the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme
Court announced a two-pronged "minimum contacts" theory of personal jurisdiction. Id. The
Court determined that due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
48 Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 67 (2d Cir. 2012); Carlisle, supra
note 26, at 100.
49 Licci, 673 F.3d at 67.
"I See, e.g., id. at 68-75 (discussing both Anti-Terrorism Act and Alien Tort Statute with
respect to New York's long-arm statute and determining an articulable nexus).
51 McGowan v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323 (N.Y. 1981).
52 Beacon Enterprises v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Fontanetta v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 421 F.2d 355, 357 (2d. Cir. 1970)) (failing to
find a sufficient nexus between Menzies' shipment of goods into New York and Beacon's cause
of action).
53 See, e.g., Armouth Int'l, Inc. v. Haband Co., 715 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(finding no jurisdictional basis because there was no breach in delivering the goods when
defendant shipped goods into New York, but cause of action arose out of breach of contract to
deliver goods to Georgia); Krajewski v. Osterlund, Inc., 490 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (finding no cause of action for product liability nor a breach of contract arising from a
sale of a truck in New York that defendant shipped into New York).
54 Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 984 N.E.2d 893, 900-01 (N.Y. 2012).
55 Id. at 900 ( first citing McGowan, 419 N.E.2d at 323; and then citing Kreutter v.
McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43-44 (N.Y. 1988)).
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New York contacts."56 The Court stated that "where at least one
element arises from the New York contacts, the relationship
between the business transaction and the claim asserted supports
specific jurisdiction under the statute."57 For example, claims for
injuries that merely connect to allegations "that a defendant's
conduct violated a duty to the plaintiffs, will satisfy the "arising out
of' requirement. '" 5 8 Accordingly, "the 'arising out of prong will be
satisfied if the plaintiff alleges the defendant's negligent conduct
has an articulable nexus to the transaction even though the injuries
may not."59
2. The "Transaction of Business" Requirement
"Transacting business" is different from "doing business."60 "Once
it is found that a defendant is 'doing' business in New York, there is
general jurisdiction over that defendant," under CPLR 301.61
"Doing business" is applied to a defendant's New York business
activity that is so systematic and continuous that the plaintiff may
sue the defendant here on any cause of action, even if it did not
arise out of the defendant's New York business.62 Under CPLR 302,
however, "a defendant who 'transacts business' in New York is
subject only to specific jurisdiction"; that is, a jurisdictional "basis
exists only for those causes of action that arise from that
transaction of business."63
The lack of in-state physical presence is not dispositive of the
question whether a non-domiciliary is transacting business in New
York. Whether a non-domiciliary is transacting business within the
meaning of CPLR section 302(a)(1) requires a finding that the non-
domiciliary's activities were purposeful and established "a
substantial relationship" between the transaction and the claim
56 Id. at 901.
51 Id. at 901.
58 Carlisle, supra note 26, at 110.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
6 See Homburger, supra note 33, at 63 (discussing that the language may look the same,
but the terms mean two different and distinct things).
61 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.04, at 3-58.
62 See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011)
(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984))
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision which addressed for the first time in nearly thirty
years whether a non-resident corporation's contacts with a state were sufficiently "continuous
and systematic" so as to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over it on claims unrelated to any
activity in the state, the standard for general jurisdiction since International Shoe Co.).
63 WEINSTEIN ET AL, supra note 1, at 302.04, 3-58-3-59.
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asserted.64 Purposeful activities are volitional acts by which the
non-domiciliary "avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws."65 A non-domiciliary transacts business when "on his or
her own initiative [the non-domiciliary] projects himself or herself
into this state to engage in a 'sustained and substantial transaction
of business."'66 It is not the quantity, but rather is the quality and
nature of the contacts that matters under New York long-arm
jurisdiction analysis.67  It follows then that sheer number of
contacts, without more, is insufficient to satisfy long-arm
jurisdiction.68
With the advancements in technology and changes in corporate
structures, courts have held that jurisdiction can be obtained
through contact by an agent, mail, telephone,69 and electronic
communications, 70 or a combination of any of these mediums. 71
6 See Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007) (quoting Deutsche Bank Sec.,
Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (N.Y. 2006)); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian
Bank, 673 F.3d 50, 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Best Van Lines, Inc, v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239,
246 (2d Cir. 2007).
65 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26 ( first quoting McKee Elec. Co. v. Raulund-Borg Corp., 229
N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1967) and then citing Ford v. Unity Hosp., 299 N.E.2d 659, 663 (N.Y.
1973)).
6 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 28 (quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256
N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970)) (holding plaintiff has sufficiently established that defendants
are subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of New York and that defendants' activities in
retaining plaintiff, a New York attorney situated in New York, to represent them in the
Oregon Action was purposeful and a sufficient nexus exists between that retention of plaintiff
and the instant claim regarding allegedly unpaid legal fees).
67 See, e.g., McShan v. Omega Louis Brandt et Frere, S.A., 536 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.
1976); Bankers Trust Co. v. Nordheimer, 746 F. Supp. 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("When a
defendant is sued upon a loan made payable in New York and the loan is subsequently the
sole basis of an agreement executed outside the state, the subsequent agreement does not rob
the New York State courts of jurisdiction." (citing Lewis and Eugenia Van Wezel Foundation
v. Guerdon Indus., Inc.,450 F.2d 1264, 1267 (2d Cir. 1971))); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian
Bank, SAL, 984 N.E.2d 893, 900 (N.Y. 2012); Scheuer v. Schwartz, 839 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("Although the [attorney] retainer agreement in issue was not made in
New York, the quantity and quality of defendant's contacts with this state in performing that
agreement demonstrate that long-arm jurisdiction . . .may be exercised over defendant.");
Bank of New York v. Strumor, 579 N.Y.S.2d 124, 124 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (involving a
promissory note that was executed in New Mexico, but had proceeds payable in New York
that were used to finance a New York limited partnership); Drake Am. Corp. v. Speakman
Co., 534 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. v. Adrianne
Kahn, Inc., 533 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
68 See Deutsche Bank Sec., 850 N.E.2d at 1143 (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp.,
522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1988)).
69 Parke-Bernet Galleries, 256 N.E.2d at 506, 509 (holding that that although the
defendant only completed a single transaction, the requirements of CPLR section 302(a)(1)
were satisfied when a California resident participated in a New York auction run by the
plaintiff through an open telephone line).
70 Deutsche Bank Sec., 850 N.E.2d at 1141 (finding that a Montana agency transacted
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Where the non-domiciliary seeks out and initiates contact with New
York, solicits business in New York, and establishes a continuing
relationship, a non-domiciliary can be said to transact business
within the meaning of CPLR section 302(a)(1). 72 As a result, use of
an "interactive" website-one which allows for the exchange of
information-may sometimes provide enough New York-targeted
activity to qualify as a transaction of business in New York,
provided the claim is based on the website activity.
73
However, passive websites, which merely impart information for
the sake of advertising without permitting a business transaction or
contract formation, are generally insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. 74  The same is true for communication which
constitutes follow-up or responsive communications to inquiries via
the passive website. 75 On passive websites, there is virtually no
interaction between the website host and users, no solicitation of
business in New York, no transaction of business, and as such, it
would be improper for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant.76
III. LEADING CASE LAW APPLYING CPLR 302(A)(1)
A. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn
As early as 1970, the Court of Appeals has analyzed the question,
"What constitutes 'transacting business' in the state of New York?
77
business in New York by negotiating and executing an agreement with plaintiff to sell
securities through a "real time" communication through Bloomberg Instant Messaging).
71 See, e.g., Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 24-25 (finding that the defendant solicited plaintiff to
perform legal services in New York and was in constant communication with him).
72 See, e.g., id. at 27.
73 See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P., 634 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that the maintenance of a passive website that may reach New Yorkers is not
sufficient for jurisdiction unless it is combined with other business activity); Citigroup, Inc. v.
City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895
N.Y.S.2d 156, 166-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Vandermark v. Jotomo Corp., 839 N.Y.S.2d 670,
672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that the maintenance of a passive website that may reach
New Yorkers is not sufficient for jurisdiction).
74 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
75 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 994, 996 (N.Y. 2014).
76 See Hall v. Lipstickalley.com, No. 101342/11, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6828, at *4-5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 5, 2011) ("Respondent's website did not render it subject to personal jurisdiction
in New York. It was clear from the record that Lipstick Alley [was] merely a passive website
which allowed users to comment on and discuss various issues with other users. There [was]
virtually no interaction between Respondent and users; nor [was] there anything in the
record to show that Respondent either solicited business in New York, or systematically and
continuously provided services to persons in New York.").
17 Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 506 (N.Y. 1970).
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The question of whether the defendant transacted business within
the state of New York, thereby subjecting him to jurisdiction, was
posed in Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn.78
In Parke-Bernet Galleries, the defendant, Dr. Franklyn, a
California resident, received a catalog from the plaintiff describing
paintings to be sold at auction in New York.79 The non-domiciliary
defendant, whose interest was intrigued by this information, sent a
letter to the plaintiff in New York indicating an amount that he
wished to bid for a Les Baigneurs painting.80 The defendant also
called the plaintiff before the auction to request that "telephonic
communication be established"81 between Parke-Bernet and him
"during the course of the bidding."8 2 The plaintiff acceded and set
up a telephone line between an employee of Parke-Bernet and the
defendant.8 3 The defendant then participated in the live bidding at
the auction.8 4 Dr. Franklyn purchased two paintings, but did not
submit payment to the plaintiff as agreed, and as a result the
plaintiff then brought suit for $96,000.5 The defendant moved to
dismiss this action pursuant to CPLR 321186 for lack of personal
jurisdiction.87
Here, the Court of Appeals reminded us of the principles
currently in place. As discussed in the Court's opinion, Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, the purpose of CPLR
302 is "to take advantage of the 'new [jurisdictional] enclave' opened
up by International Shoe where the nonresident defendant has
engaged in some purposeful activity in this State in connection with
the matter at suit."'8 It is well settled that proof of a single
transaction in New York would satisfy this requirement.8 9 Thus,
the Court has made clear that one does not need to be present in the
state in order to be subjected to jurisdiction. 90 "[U]nder CPLR
78 Id.
79 Id. at 507.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 (McKinney 2015); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 256 N.E.2d at 507.
87 Id.
88 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 75 (N.Y.
1965) (quoting Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1948)).
89 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.06(b) ("[Ihe Parke-Bernet holding has not been
extended to include cases in which the non-resident makes a single ordinary phone call to
New York, nor is it likely to be.").
90 Id. ("Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v. Franklyn established that a defendant can transact
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302..., particularly in this day of instant long-range
communications, one can engage in extensive purposeful activity
here without ever actually setting foot in the State."91
Although the defendant was never actually present in New York,
he received and transmitted bids over an open telephone line and
actively participated in an auction in New York.92 It cannot be
ignored that Mr. Nash, who was indeed physically present at the
time of the bidding, assisted Dr. Franklyn.9 3 The Court gave great
consideration to the fact that the defendant "projected himself into
the auction room in order to compete with the other prospective
purchasers .... "94
The Court ultimately held that Dr. Franklyn "'purposefully'
availed himself 'of the privilege[s] of conducting activities' within
New York and thereby 'invok[ed] the benefits and protections of its
laws."' 95  As such, the Court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. This holding was an early step toward expanding the
reach of CPLR section 302(a)(1).
B. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments
Following Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., about thirty years later, in
2006, the Court of Appeals was again faced with the question of
whether there was a sufficient basis for the exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1) in Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments.96
Here, the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. (hereinafter
"DBSI"), a Delaware corporation with headquarters in New York,
engaged in securities trading with the defendant, Montana Board of
Investments (hereinafter "MBOI"), a Montana state agency. 97 This
case concerned one bond transaction in particular; however, the
parties had engaged in "eight other bond transactions with a face
value totaling over $ 100 million" over the "past thirteen months."98
A representative from DBSI had entered into discussions
soliciting the sale of Pennzoil-Quaker State Company bonds with a
business in New York for jurisdictional purposes without actually setting foot in the state.").
91 Parke-Bernet Galleries, 256 N.E.2d at 508 (citing Int'l Shoe Co., v. Washington, 326 U.S.
at 310, 316-17 (1945)).
92 Parke-Bernet Galleries, 256 N.E.2d at 507.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 508.
95 Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
96 Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1142-43 (N.Y. 2006).
97 Id. at 1141.
98 Id.
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member of MBOI. 99 This discussion was conducted over an instant
messaging service provider, Bloomberg Messaging System; at first,
MBOI rejected the trade proposal, but approximately ten minutes
after the initial online discussion, MBOI initiated a new instant
message inquiring as to "whether the price originally quoted...
applied only to the swap, or if it would be the same for a cash
purchase."100 The parties agreed to a sale price of $15 million for
the Pennzoil stock and DBSI "sent a trade ticket and confirmation
of the deal."10 1
Only hours after the sale was completed, Shell Oil acquired
Pennzoil, most likely causing the price of the bonds to increase. 10 2
The following day, MBOI advised DBSI that they were breaking the
trade claiming that DBSI "had inside information and the trade was
'unethical [and] probably illegal."'10 3 The plaintiff brought action for
breach of contract, and the defendant argued that the plaintiff
lacked personal jurisdiction.10 4
New York County Supreme Court held that there was in fact a
lack of jurisdiction; however, the Appellate Division reversed. 05
The Court of Appeals affirmed holding that personal jurisdiction did
exist over the defendant under the long-arm statute. 10 6 The Court
relied heavily on an earlier decision in Kreutter v. McFadden Oil
Corp. 107
The Court stated that:
[T]he growth of national markets for commercial trade, as
well as technological advances in communication, enable a
party to transact enormous volumes of business within a
state without physically entering it. Thus, we held that "[s]o
long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has
sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably
expect to defend its actions there, due process is not offended
if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not 'present'
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1141-42.
101 Id. at 1142.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1143.
107 See id. at 1142-43. Kreutter involved a purchase and leaseback of oil-drilling
equipment. Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. 1988). Defendant was a
Texas based corporation licensed to do business in New York. Id. Plaintiffs investments
were not acknowledged and he sought recovery of his expenditures, along with other relief.
Id.
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in that State."108
Further, the Court relied on its earlier decision, as discussed
above in Parke-Bernet Galleries, recognizing "long-arm jurisdiction
over commercial actors and investors using electronic and
telephonic means to project themselves into New York to conduct
business transactions."10 9
C. Fischbarg v. Doucet
One year after Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., in 2007, the Court
of Appeals was once again faced with the same issue of whether
personal jurisdiction was correctly exercised under the transaction
of business requirement of CPLR section 302(a)(1) in Fischbarg v.
Doucet.110  In this case, the defendant, Suzanne Bell-Doucet-
President of Only New Age Music, Inc. ("ONAM") and a California
resident-telephoned the plaintiff, an attorney practicing in New
York."' The parties discussed the plaintiffs representation of
Suzanne and ONAM in an action in Oregon.11 2 Ms. Bell-Doucet
mailed a letter to the plaintiffs office to confirm their agreement to
take the defendants' case.113 The defendants sent over documents
for the plaintiffs review and entered into a retainer agreement by
phone from the New York office. 114
The plaintiff represented the defendants in the Oregon action
although "he was never physically present in Oregon" and he also
never met with the defendants in California.11 5 The plaintiff
remained in New York for the duration of the case, and he
conducted all of his work in this action from his New York office.
116
[O]ver the course of approximately nine months... during
his representation of ONAM in the Oregon action, he spoke
with defendants by telephone at least twice per week
regarding their case. Plaintiffs time records also show that
on at least 31 occasions defendants sent e-mails regarding
the Oregon case to plaintiff, that on three occasions they
108 Deutsche Bank Sec., 850 N.E.2d at 1142-43 (quoting Kruetter, 522 N.E.2d at 43).
109 Deutsche Bank Sec., 850 N.E.2d at 1143 (first citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v.
Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970); then citing Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of
Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 731 (N.Y. 1980)).
110 Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 24 (N.Y. 2007).
1I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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faxed materials to him, and that defendants sent plaintiff
documents, by either mail or e-mail, seven times.117
Plaintiff and defendants entered into a dispute regarding the
terms of plaintiffs retainer agreement, resulting in plaintiffs
resignation as their attorney. 118 The plaintiff moved for legal fees,
but once denied, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the defendants
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under CPLR 3211.119
The Court stated, "jurisdiction is proper 'even though the
defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant's
activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial
relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted."' 120
Not all activities will constitute a "transaction of business," such as
"merely telephon[ing] a single order"121 or "communications and
shipments sent here by an out-of-state doctor serving as a
'consultant' to plaintiffs New York physician."1 22  However, the
Court discussed that limited contacts were not an issue here.1 23 The
Court analyzed the defendants' purposeful attempts to establish an
attorney-client relationship and the related contacts.1 24 The Court
held that "[t]he quality of defendants' contacts here establishes a
transaction of business in New York."125 The defendants "sought
out [the] plaintiff in New York and established an ongoing attorney-
client relationship with him."126
The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. where it stated: "one need not be physically present
[here] . . . to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts under CPLR
302. '127 "Thus, even when physical presence is lacking, jurisdiction
may still be proper if the defendant 'on his [or her] own initiative..
* project[s] himself [or herselfl' into this state to engage in a
117 Id. at 24-25.
118 Id. at 25.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 26 (quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1142
(N.Y. 2006)).
121 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v. Franklyn, 256
N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970)).
122 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26 (citing Etra v. Matta, 463 N.E.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. 1984)).
123 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 27.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y.
1970)).
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'sustained and substantial transaction of business.' 128  Here, as
well as the earlier cases discussed in this article, the defendants
were found to have "engaged in [a] sustained and substantial
transaction of business in New York." 129
Finally, the Court also addressed the Constitutional
considerations after completing the statutory analysis. It stated
that its decision is in accordance with due process. 130 Given the
facts here involving the parties' contacts, the defendants should
reasonably have expected to defend a suit in New York.1 31 It is
important to note however, that the Court does not define "precisely
what level of communication is necessary to constitute a transaction
of business." 132 For example, how much work has to be done on
behalf of a client? Can one contact satisfy this requirement, or does
it need to be a pattern or series? 133 Nonetheless, it appears that
with this decision, the Court is attempting to expand the reach of
CPLR section 302(a)(1) in response to the changes in society.
D. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL
Five years later, the Court of Appeals was once again faced with a
question concerning whether jurisdiction was proper under CPLR
section 302(a)(1) in Licci v. Lebanese Canandian Bank, SAL.1 34 The
plaintiffs in this action comprised of "several dozen United States,
Canadian, and Israeli citizens who resided in Israel" on behalf of
family members killed and/or injured in rocket attacks during the
Second Lebanon War.1 35 The suit was filed against the defendant,
also known as LCB, alleging that they facilitated monetary
transactions in aiding and abetting terrorism, along with several
other claims.1 36
Here, the Court had to decide whether the defendant's regular
correspondence with the bank to effect transfers in New York
constituted a transaction of business under CPLR section 302(a)(1),
which it decided in the affirmative; the Court viewed the contacts as
128 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 28 (quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries, 256 N.E.2d at 508).
129 Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 28.
130 Id. at 30. The Court found a substantial relationship between the defendant's activities
and this claim and the plaintiff had devoted and focused directly on this work for the
defendant's behalf. Id. at 29-30.
131 Id.
132 Carlisle, supra note 12, at 423.
133 Id. at 424.
134 Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 984 N.E.2d 893, 895 (N.Y. 2012).
135 Id. at 894.
136 Id.
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"a 'course of dealing' [which showed] purposeful availment of New
York's dependable and transparent banking system." 137 The Licci
Court's "holding represents a more precise definition of what
constitutes a 'transaction of business' under CPLR section 302(a)(1)
and provides proper precedent for future jurisdictional inquiries by
the bench and [the] bar of New York," 138 further refining the test for
what constitutes a transaction of business under CPLR section
302(a)(1).
The Licci case upholds the arising out of requirement derived
from CPLR section 302(a)(1) in which a "substantial relationship" or
"articulable nexus" must exist between the transaction and the
claim asserted.139 As the court explained, under CPLR section
302(a)(1), the 'transaction of business' prong is limited by the
'arising from' prong, which restricts jurisdiction to claims that are
arguably and meaningfully connected to the business transacted in
New York. 140
IV. PATERNO V LASER SPINE INSTITUTE
The Paterno case was originally filed in New York State Supreme
Court, Westchester County, and the trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the grounds
that there was no statutory basis under CPLR section 302(a)(1).141
The court held that CPLR section 302(a)(1) was inapplicable in this
case and the motion insofar as it sought to dismiss for lack of long-
arm jurisdiction was granted.142 The court maintained that the
"[d]efendants [had] no physical presence within the state and the
services they offered to perform [were] outside the state."143 The
court did not believe that "viewed in their totality," the defendants
137 Carlisle, supra note 26, at 102-03. This section uses the exact language contained in
Licci when discussing how repeated use of a correspondent account on behalf of a client
indicates a "course of dealing." Licci, 984 N.E.2d at 900.
138 Carlisle, supra note 26, at 103.
139 Licci, 984 N.E.2d at 901.
140 Carlisle, supra note 26, at 103-04 (quoting Licci, 984 N.E.2d at 900-01).
141 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., No. 2010-22125, 2011 WL 11003906, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 25, 2011).
142 Id.
143 Id.
The only physical entry by defendants into New York [was] an occasional informational
seminar which lack[ed] a substantial relationship to the claim asserted as plaintiff did
not attend such a seminar.
Other activities cited by plaintiff, such as telephone calls and e-mails from defendants
fail to qualify, by themselves, as a transaction of business within New York.
Id.
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activities showed a purposeful effort "to avail themselves of the
forum state," since the activities "were related to or arose out of the
services provided in Florida."'144
Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department, which addressed the question of whether there
was a statutory basis under CPLR section 302(a)(1) for plaintiff to
bring their case in a New York court. 145 The appellate court, after
determining that defendant's website was passive, went on to do a
statutory analysis, and found that the lower court correctly
concluded that the arising out of requirement of CPLR section
302(a)(1) was not met, that there was no basis for imposing long-
arm jurisdiction over a Florida medical facility and physicians, and
that the case was properly dismissed. 146  The appellate court
reiterated the trial court's holding that the "totality of
circumstances" did not provide "the plaintiff with a basis for
imposing long-arm jurisdiction over the defendants."'147 Plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York who affirmed the
Second Department holding. 48
144 Id. In May 2008, plaintiff "was suffering from severe back pain." Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant at 3, Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 973 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No.
2011-04654). While on the homepage of a well-known Internet service provider, plaintiff
discovered an advertisement for LSI, a surgical facility specializing in spine surgery, with its
home facility and principal place of business in Tampa, Florida. Id. Plaintiff clicked on the
LSI advertisement and viewed a five-minute video presentation of a testimonial from a
former LSI patient and professional golfer, extolling LSI's medical services. Id. The
advertisement appeared to hold out the promise of relief for plaintiffs back problems. Id. As
a result of the advertisement, Frank Paterno communicated with LSI by telephone and
Internet to inquire about possible surgical procedures to alleviate his pain. Id. After his
initial inquiries in May 2008, plaintiff sought a medical assessment of his condition by LSI,
and sent to LSI's Florida facility certain magnetic resonance imaging (MR) films of his back.
Id. at *4. On May 30, 2008, the same day that he received the letter, LSI informed him that
there had been a cancellation and that plaintiff could take the open spot and have the surgery
performed at a significant discount due to the short notice. Id. LSI offered a June 9, 2008
surgery date. Id. On June 9th, Paterno underwent surgery at the LSI facility. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff experienced extreme pain following the surgery. Id. Plaintiff underwent a second
surgical procedure at LSI on June 11th. Id. He again experienced severe pain after the
surgery. See id. For two weeks following his return to New York on June 12th, plaintiff
contacted the LSI physicians on a daily basis to discuss his medical status and to complain
about his postoperative pain. Id. at 6-7. LSI doctors and staff addressed his request for pain
medication by calling prescriptions into local pharmacies in plaintiffs home city, which he
then filled. Id. at 7. For approximately three months, plaintiff claims to have communicated
daily with LSI staff via text messages, emails and telephone calls. Id. at 8.
145 See Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 973 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), affd, 23
N.E.3d 988 (N.Y. 2014).
146 Id. at 690, 691.
147 Id. at 686.
148 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 990 (N.Y. 2014).
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A. Summary of Paterno Holdings
1. Trial Court Holding
The trial court's motion granting defendant's motion to dismiss
was issued on March 25, 2011 in the form of a Decision and Order
by Nicholas Colabella. 149 The trial court granted defendants', Laser
Spine Institute, Craig Wolff, M.D., Kevin Scott, M.D., Robert
Gruber, D.O., Vernon Morris, M.D. and Peter Horowitz, M.D.
("defendants"), motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. 150  The court held that there was no long-arm
jurisdiction over the defendants. 151
a. 302 (a)(1)
Judge Colabella explained CPLR section 302(a)(1) was
inapplicable in this case since "defendants maintain[ed] no physical
presence within the state, and the services they offered to perform
[were] outside the state."152  Judge Colabella declared that CPLR
section 302(a)(1) requires a showing that the cause of action arises
from the transaction of business in the state. 153
A single transaction "may be sufficient for jurisdiction, even
though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the
defendant's activities here were purposeful, and there is a
substantial relationship between the transaction and the
claim asserted .... .
149 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., No. 2010-22125, 2011 WL 11003906, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 25, 2011). The plaintiffs also argued jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(3). Id.
Judge Colabella maintained that CPLR section 302(a)(3) was inapplicable "as the alleged
tortious activity [in the case] did not cause injury to [the] plaintiff within the state within the
meaning of the statute." Id. The judge dismissed plaintiffs 302(a)(3) claim, stating "[t]he
situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the
location where the resulting damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff," and that the acts
that allegedly caused Paterno's injury all took place in Florida. Id. (quoting Vaichunas v.
Tonyes, 877 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); then citing Kramer v. Hotel Los
Monteros, 394 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)).
150 Paterno, 2011 WL 11003906, at *1.
151 Id.
152 Id. Judge Colabella opined that although there were "offices for consultation and
regional surgical centers in various states, none [were] in New York." Id. But see Plaintiffs
Affirmation in Opposition at 18, Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., No. 2010-22125, 2011 WL
11003906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011) (No. 2010-22125) ("What is most remarkable about
the defendants' motion is that the defendants claim to have no business relationship with
New York, yet its web site lists a location in New York, New York."); id. at 24 ("LSI
conducts seminars for its services in the following states:, [sic] New York, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Arizona, Texas, New Jersey, Oregon, Ohio and California.").
153 See Paterno, 2011 WL 11003906, at *1.
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"Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant,
through volitional acts, avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws. 154
In determining whether defendants engaged in sufficient
purposeful activity to confer long-arm jurisdiction, Judge Colabella
performed a totality of the circumstances analysis, and found that
the defendant had not purposefully availed itself to the privileges
associated with conducting business in New York. 155
2. Appellate Court Holding
On October 16, 2013 the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision. 156 The appellate court concluded that the defendants'
contacts with New York were insufficient to confer long-arm
jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1), and further rejected
plaintiffs alternative basis for personal jurisdiction under CPLR
section 302(a)(3) because he suffered his injuries outside the
State. 157 In doing so, the court addressed the "evolving issue of
personal jurisdiction."158
The appellate court found that 'the totality of circumstances'
[did] not provide the plaintiff with a basis for imposing long-arm
jurisdiction over the defendants,"'159 and further noted that personal
jurisdiction could not be based upon LSI's website since the website
was informational and passive in nature.160  Citing Zippo
1- Id. (first quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1988); and
Opticare Acquisition Corp. v. Castillo, 806 N.Y.S.2d 84, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); second
quoting Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007)) (citations omitted). Colabella
reasoned that "[t]he only physical entry by defendants into New York was an occasional
informational seminar which," according to the Judge, 'lack[ed] a substantial relationship to
the claim asserted as plaintiff did not attend such a seminar." Paterno, 2011 WL 11003906,
at *1.
155 Id. According to Judge Colabella, the telephone calls and emails "viewed in their
totality" "do not show a purposeful effort by defendants to avail themselves of the forum state
as such activities were related to or arose out of the services provided in Florida." Id.
156 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 973 N.Y.S.2d 681, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
157 See id. at 686, 689.
158 Id. at 683.
159 Id. at 686.
160 Id. at 690. The Second Department found that "[tihe record in this case ... contained
only sparse evidence regarding the nature of LSI's website." Id. at 696 (Dickerson, J.,
dissenting). The plaintiff stated that he learned of LSI through an advertisement on AOL's
home page. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 144, at 3. As a result of observing this
advertisement and viewing the testimonial, the plaintiff contacted LSJ. Id. There is also a
printout in the record of LSI seminar dates which was allegedly printed from LSI's website.
Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 696 (Dickerson, J., dissenting). Besides these documents, the
Second Department found "the record devoid of evidence concerning the nature of LSI's
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Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,161 the appellate court
concluded that based on the record, there was no basis to conclude
that LSI's website could be characterized, under the Zippo
continuum, 162 as anything other than a passive website. 163
The Second Department acknowledged that, with regard to
internet websites and personal jurisdiction:
[A] website's interactivity may be useful for analyzing
personal jurisdiction under [CPLR section] 302(a)(1), but
only insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant
"transacts any business" in New York-that is, whether the
defendant, through the website, "purposefully avail[ed]
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within New
York, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws."
16 4
The appellate court found that:
[N]either the fact that the plaintiff underwent certain testing
in New York . . . in connection with his Florida treatment,
nor the fact that the individual defendants telephoned
prescriptions to the plaintiffs New York pharmacy, nor even
that the defendants had conversations with the plaintiffs
local physician, requir[ed] the conclusion that the defendants
website from which to reach any conclusions concerning that website's degree of
interactivity." Id. "When a website is passive ... plaintiffs may have to prove 'something
more' to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction-that is, plaintiffs must show that
defendant 'purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the
forum state."' Morilla v. Laser Spine Inst., LLC, No. 2:10-cv-01882 (WHW), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83608, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010) (citing S. Morantz, Inc. v Hang & Shine
Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
161 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
162 Id. at 1124 ("At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. . . . At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users
in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal
jurisdiction .... The middle ground is occupied by interactive web sites where a user can
exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site." (first citing Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257, 1264-65, 66 (6th Cir. 1996); second citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); third citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996))) (citations omitted).
163 See Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
164 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 696 (Dickerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v.
Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007)).
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transacted business in New York. 165
3. Court of Appeals
On November 20, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the court
below, dismissing "plaintiff Frank Paterno['s] appealfl from the
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his medical malpractice
action against non-domiciliary defendants Laser Spine Institute
(LSI) and various LSI professionals." 166  The Court of Appeals
concluded that defendants' contacts with New York were
insufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR section
302(a)(1), as the defendants did not transact business in New York,
their website was passive, and their communications were merely
responsive in nature and did not constitute purposeful availment. 167
Put simply, the court determined that the record in this case did not
contain any evidence that LSI 'solicited' the plaintiffs business,
other than the internet advertisement by which the plaintiff became
aware of its services. 68 The Court of Appeals also stressed that
New York's long-arm jurisdiction requires more than most states. 69
According to the Court of Appeal's decision, these factors led the
Court to find that there was no long-arm jurisdiction over the
defendants.170
B. Analysis of Court of Appeals Reasoning in Paterno
1. "Transaction of Business" Requirement
The Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether LSI's
conduct constituted a "transaction of business" under CPLR section
302(a)(1). 171 The Court began its analysis by laying out CPLR
section 302(a)(1) and expressed "[w]hether a non-domiciliary is
transacting business within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1) is a fact
165 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
166 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 990 (N.Y. 2014).
167 See id. at 994.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 995, 996. For the proposition that New York courts have repeatedly
recognized that New York's long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction in every case where
it is constitutionally permissible. See id. at 996; Talbot v. Johnsons Newspaper Corp., 522
N.E.2d 1027, 1027 (N.Y. 1998) (citing Banco Ambrosiano, S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd.,
464 N.E.2d 432, 435 (N.Y. 1984)); Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46 (N.Y.
1988); Banco Ambrosiano, 464 N.E.2d at 435.
170 See Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 995, 996.
171 Id. at 990, 992.
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based determination, and requires a finding that the non-
domiciliary's activities were purposeful and established 'a
substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim
asserted."' 172  The Court disagreed with plaintiffs argument that
the totality of defendants' contacts established that it conducted
business in New York, and stated that "[i]n order to satisfy 'the
overriding criterion" necessary to establish a transaction of
business' within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1), a non-domiciliary
must commit an act by which it 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in New York."' 173 Citing Fischbarg
v. Doucet, the Court expressed that there must be a substantial
relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.174
The Court of Appeals relying on its decision in Fischbarg,
conflated its CPLR section 302(a)(1) analysis with a due process
analysis in considering whether LSI performed an act by which it
purposefully availed itself to the privileges of conducting business in
New York. 175 The Court, citing to Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.,
noted that although "[t]he lack of an in-state physical presence is
not dispositive of the question whether a non-domiciliary is
transacting business in New York[,]" LSI had not by conduct of
individual actors or by technological methods permitted business
transactions which would constitute transaction of business in New
York.1 76 The Court of Appeals, referencing Fischbarg and quoting
Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., stated that:
Regardless of whether by bricks and mortar structures, by
conduct of individual actors, or by technological methods
that permit business transaction and communications
without the physical crossing of borders, a non-domiciliary
transacts business when "on his .. .own initiative . . . [the
non-domiciliary] projects himself' . . . into [New York] to
engage in a "sustained and substantial transaction of
172 Id. at 992 (quoting Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007)).
173 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (quoting Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834
(N.Y. 2007)).
174 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (citing Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 27).
175 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 ('Thus, where the non-domiciliary seeks out and initiates
contact with New York, solicits business in New York, and establishes a continuing
relationship, a non-domiciliary can be said to transact business within the meaning of CPLR
302(a)(1)." (citing Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 27)).
176 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (citing Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 850
N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (N.Y. 2006)). "More than limited contacts are required for purposeful
activities sufficient to establish that the non-domiciliary transacted business in New York."
Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (citing Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E. at 834).
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business." 177
Additionally, the Court of Appeals discussed whether LSI's
website was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the
defendants. 178 In doing so, the Court found that LSI's website was
passive since it "merely impart[ed] information without permitting
a business transaction .. "..",179 Since the Court of Appeals
ultimately found that the website alone was insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction, the Court then examined whether the quality
of defendant's contacts with plaintiff would allow for long-arm
jurisdiction over the defendants.180 The Court found the additional
telephone and other correspondence was not enough to constitute
the transaction of business required by CPLR section 302(a)(1).181
The Court focused on the fact that plaintiff made the call to LSI
that initiated the contact.18 2
According to the Court of Appeals, LSI did not project itself into
New York to engage in a sustained and substantial transaction of
business.18 3 The Court did not agree with the plaintiffs argument
that the totality of defendants' contacts established that it
conducted business in New York through its solicitation and several
communications related to LSI's medical treatment of plaintiff.
18 4
177 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (quoting Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 28). See also Deutsche
Bank Sec., 850 N.E.2d at 1143 (holding that CPLR section 302(a)(1) long-arm jurisdiction
over out-of-state institutional investor who called plaintiff, a New York securities firm, to
make a trade and the suit arose from that transaction); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970) (finding that a California defendant who actively
participated in live auction held in New York via telephone was subject to jurisdiction under
CPLR section 302(a)(1) in an action arising out of that auction).
178 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994 (citing Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895 N.Y.S.2d 156, 165 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010)). See also discussion supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing passive
websites).
179 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994.
1se Id. Passive websites, such as the LSI website, which "merely impart information
without permitting a business transaction are generally insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction." Id. (citing Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 165). See also discussion supra note 76
(discussing passive websites).
181 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994-95.
182 See id. at 993-94; Affidavit of Frank Paterno in Opposition to Motion at 5, Paterno v.
Laser Spine Inst., 2011 WL 11003906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011) (No. 22125/10) ("As a
result of this advertisement, I contacted LSI by telephone and internet to inquire of the
procedures and to get an evaluation of my personal medical condition.").
183 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994-95.
184 Id. at 994. The Court of Appeals did not believe that contacts made after plaintiff's
June and August surgeries in Florida could be the basis to establish defendant's relationship
with New York because they did not serve as the basis for the underlying medical malpractice
claim. Id. at 995 (citing Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[I]n
most cases, where the cause of action must arise from the contacts, contacts after the cause of
action arises will be irrelevant.")). Further, the Court of Appeals opined, "defendants'
contacts with New York at the behest of the plaintiff subsequent to the first two Florida
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Rather, "[t]urning to the content and 'quality' of defendants'
contacts with plaintiff," the Court of Appeals reasoned that the
contacts "were responsive in nature, and not the type of interactions
that demonstrate the purposeful availment necessary to confer
personal jurisdiction over ... out-of-state defendants." 18 5 The Court
in its analysis highlighted that the plaintiff admitted that he was
the party who sought out and initiated contact with defendants
after viewing LSI's website.18 6
The Court of Appeals referenced its prior decisions: Fischbarg, v.
Doucet, Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, and Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investors, where the Court
found jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1).18 7 However, the
Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a factual comparison of
the defendants' contacts in those cases did not support the outcome
in Paterno.188 Arguably the Court of Appeals simply paid "lip
service" to its prior decisions and distorted the statutory analysis of
CPLR section 302(a)(1), with its due process-fairness concerns and
policy considerations.18 9 The court should have first determined if
there was a statutory bases for jurisdiction and then have done a
surgeries but before the third cannot be used to demonstrate defendants actively projected
themselves into New York." Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 995 (citing Skrodzki v. Marcello, 810 F.
Supp. 2d 501, 510, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[D]efendant's contacts with forum state arising from
initial communication with plaintiff irrelevant for CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdictional analysis.")).
185 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994 (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 993-94 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that due to the extent and "sheer
volume of contacts, defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction"). The Court found that:
[o]nce plaintiff confirmed his interest, and the... surgery date was set, he fully engaged
with defendants in order to ensure that all pre-surgical matters were completed .... As
part of the preparation for plaintiffs arrival, these communications served the
convenience of plaintiff and ... failed to establish that defendants "availed themselves of
the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state."
Id. at 994-995 (first citing Milliken v. Holst, 612 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
then quoting Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007)) (internal citations omitted).
187 See Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 994; Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 30; Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v.
Mont. Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (N.Y. 2006); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1970).
188 Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (citing Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 850 N.E.2d at 1142 ("holding
that CPLR 302(a)(1) long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state institutional investor who called
plaintiff, a New York securities firm, to make a trade, and the suit arose from that
transaction")); Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 256 N.E.2d at
508 ("California defendant who actively participated in live auction held in New York via
telephone [was] subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) in an action arising out of that
auction.")).
189 See discussion supra note 188. See also Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 995 ("[T]o find
defendants' conduct here constitutes transacting business within the meaning of CPLR
302(a)(1), based on contacts before and after the surgeries, would set a precedent for almost
limitless jurisdiction over out-of-state medical providers in future cases."). This statement
should not be included in the Court's statutory analysis of basis. It is appropriate for a due
process inquiry which the Court failed to conduct.
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due process inquiry.
V. CRITIQUE OF PATERNO
A. Grimaldi v. Guinn
The Court of Appeals failed to address or to distinguish the
jurisdictional analysis of the Appellate Divisions dissent in Paterno.
In this respect the dissent, authored by Justice Dickerson, relies on
Grimaldi v. Guinn, which we will discuss before analyzing the
Dickerson dissent.
The plaintiff, Mark. A. Grimaldi, owned a 1969 Chevrolet Camaro
for which he purchased a cross-ram manifold and carburetor
assembly.190  The cross-ram was sold to him by Rick's First
Generation Camaro in Athens, Georgia, and shipped to the plaintiff
at his home address in New York. 191 The shipment also contained a
"certification by the defendant, Wayne D. Guinn of Guinn's
engineering, located in" New Jersey, stating that the cross-ram was
authentic. 192 After several communications, the plaintiff delivered
the Camaro to the defendant, Guinn, in order for him to install the
cross-ram and communicated with the defendant via "numerous
telephone calls, faxes, and e-mails" and viewing Guinn's website as
to his involvement in installing the cross-ram. 193
The defendant used this project in order to solicit further business
and advertised the project on their websites. 194  For a period
spanning over one year, the plaintiff had submitted payment to the
defendants over and above the original quote.1 95 After a multitude
of communications between the parties, the plaintiff received the
Camaro more than one year later, and the cross-ram was completely
disassembled and nowhere close to completion.1 96 Plaintiff brought
suit against defendant for several causes of action.1 97 By order
190 Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
19, Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 158-59.
195 Id. at 158, 159.
'9 Id. at 159.
197 See id. at 159. The Grimaldi complaint contained four causes of action. Id. at 159-60.
First, the plaintiff alleged that the parties reached an agreement, which the defendants had
breached. Id. at 159. The plaintiff alleged that defendants violated General Business Law §
349 and made inducements to the plaintiff allowing him to rely on their representations. Id.
Finally, plaintiff sought punitive damages. Id. at 160. Defendants Guinn and Tischler moved
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR section 3211(a)(8) for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
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dated July 18, 2008, the Honorable James V. Brands, denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied under CPLR section
§302(a)(1). 198  Judge Brands held that the defendants have
subjected themselves to this court's personal jurisdiction and
Defendant Guinn appealed the order. 199
Honorable Judge Thomas Dickerson rendered the Appellate Court
decision.200 The court discussed New York's long-arm jurisdiction
statute, that "a court may exercise jurisdiction over a [defendant]
who . . . 'transacts any business within the state or contracts
anywhere to supply goods or services in the state."'20 1 It examined
in detail three elements: "the [q]uality of [c]ontacts and [o]ngoing
[r]elationships;" "[p]ersonal [j]urisdiction and the Internet;" and
"[p]urposeful [c]reation of [c]ontinuing [r]elationship." 202  We take
each element in turn.
1. Quality/Quantity of Contacts
First, the court established that the quality of the contacts is to be
considered and weighed, based on Fischbarg and Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc.20 3 As discussed above, in Fischbarg v. Doucet, the
defendants, through numerous means of communication, attempted
to establish an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff.204 The
Court held that the "[d]efendants sought out [the] plaintiff ... [and]
198 Id. at 161 ("[A]ny nondomiciliary who transacts any business within New York State or
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of New York courts.").
199 Id. ("The [Dutchess County] Supreme Court concluded that, in communicating with the
plaintiff, performing work on the plaintiffs vehicle, having others perform work on the
plaintiffs vehicle, accepting payment from the plaintiff for that work, and providing goods
and services to the plaintiff in New York, [Guinn] subjected [himself] to [personal]
jurisdiction.").
200 Id. at 158; see Justices of the Court: Associate Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, N.Y.S.
UNIFIED CT. Sys., App. Div., SECOND DEPT.,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/justicedickerson.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). It
is important to keep in mind that later we will see Judge Dickerson delivering the dissent in
Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 973 N.Y.S.2d 681, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (Dickerson, J.,
dissenting).
201 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
202 See id. at 163-68 (focusing on the quality of the contacts, rather than the quantity); id.
at 162 ("Although it is impossible to precisely fix those acts that constitute a transaction of
business, [the Court of Appeals'] precedents establish that it is the quality of the defendants'
New York contacts that is the primary consideration." (quoting Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880
N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007))); id. ('Whether a non-domiciliary has engaged in sufficient
purposeful activity to confer jurisdiction in New York requires an examination of the totality
of the circumstances."' (quoting Farkas v. Farkas, 830 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007))).
203 See Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64.
204 See supra Part III.C.
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defendants communicated regularly with plaintiff in this state."20 5
In addition, in Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., "[t]he Court of Appeals
determined that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the
New York courts in connection with an action arising out of the
auction."206
2. Active/Passive Website
Second, the defendants advertised on their websites that they
perform services "in the Northeast."20 7 Plaintiff stated that he first
contacted the defendant by calling the number found on the
website.208 Plaintiff also states that his wife ordered a book through
the website as well.209 The court here analyzed the use of online
presence in establishing jurisdiction. One of the leading cases used
in its analysis was Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc. 210 Zippo Manufacturing Co. was a trademark infringement
action where the defendant was based in California and maintained
an interactive website to "exchange[] information with
Pennsylvania residents in hopes of using that information for
commercial gain later."211 The court held that there was personal
jurisdiction of the defendant because of their "conscious choice to
conduct business" 212 and further stating that "[a] passive Web site
that does little more than make information available to those who
are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction" and goes on to state that "the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site."
2 1 3
"However, passive Web sites, when combined with other business
activity, may provide a reasonable basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction. 214 In Citigroup, Inc. v. City Holding Co.,215
205 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 163 (quoting Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 271).
206 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256
N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970)).
207 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 164-65.
211 Id. at 164 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D.
Pa. 1997)).
212 Id. at 1126 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
213 Id. at 1124 ( first citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); then second citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334
(E.D. Mo. 1996)).
214 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
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for example, the court found that customers in New York can apply
for loans on-line, print out applications to send by fax, and even
chat with a representative on-line, which was held sufficient to
support personal jurisdiction.216 In Grimaldi, the court found that
the website was passive, even though the plaintiff obtained contact
information from it, and the plaintiffs wife was able to conduct a
transaction online.217
3. Purposeful Availment/Establishing a Continuing Relationship
Finally, the court also considered the defendant's purposeful
availment and attempt to create a continuing relationship. It is
here that the court concluded:
[I]n light of the number, nature, and timing of all of the
contacts involved, including the numerous telephone, fax, e-
mail, and other written communications with the plaintiff in
New York that Guinn initiated subsequent to his initial
involvement in the project, as well as the manner in which
Guinn employed his decidedly passive Web site for
commercial access, Guinn must be deemed to have sufficient
contacts with this state.218
The court's position was that the defendant created a purposeful
relationship with the plaintiff where he would be involved in the
project, holding that the numerous email contacts between the
parties and at least twenty-seven calls made from the defendants to
the plaintiff, were sufficient contact to hold them accountable in this
state. 21 9  Importantly, the court considered the constitutional
aspects of finding that the defendants transacted business in New
York, and concluded that taking into account there circumstances of
this case, exercising jurisdiction over the defendants "would not be
inconsistent with traditional notions of due process, fair play, and
substantial justice. 220
1264 (6th Cir. 1996)).
215 Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
216 Id. at 570, 571.
217 Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 164, 167.
218 Id. at 167.
219 Id. at 167-68.
220 Id. at 168 (quoting Bogal v. Finger, 874 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)).
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B. Judge Dickerson's Dissent: Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute
Dissent
The majority, at the appellate level, argued the contacts that
occurred in Grimaldi v. Guinn221 were more extensive than those at
issue in Paterno.222 It is important to note that Judge Dickerson,
who authored the majority decision in Grimaldi223 also wrote the
dissent in Paterno.224 The dissent in Paterno found jurisdiction
under CPLR section 302(a)(1) and argued that the defendants
purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of New York as the
forum state and that litigating in New York would not offend
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 225
Similar to the approach taken by the majority in Grimaldi, Judge
Dickerson also analyzed the Paterno case based on the totality of
circumstances, but came to a different conclusion than the majority.
He argued that based on the totality of circumstances:
[I]n light of the number, nature, and timing of all of the
contacts involved, including the numerous telephone, email,
and text message communications with the plaintiff in New
York, the consultations with the plaintiffs New York
physicians, the filling of prescriptions in New York
pharmacies, and the ordering of blood work and MRIs in
New York, as well as LSI's use of its website to solicit
business from internet users, LSI had sufficient contacts
with New York to be subject to its long-arm jurisdiction.226
Comparing Paterno's contacts with the contacts in Grimaldi,
Judge Dickerson opined that Paterno's contacts were more
extensive than those at issue in Grimaldi, in which the Second
Department concluded that:
"[B]ased on the deployment of a passive website, coupled
with the 'number, nature, and timing of all of the contacts
involved, including the numerous telephone, fax, e-mail, and
other written communications with the plaintiff in New
York,' the defendant Guinn had sufficient contacts with New
221 See Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
222 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 973 N.Y.S.2d 681, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (quoting
Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 165).
223 Id. at 158.
224 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (Dickerson, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 698, 700 (citing Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 168).
226 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Dickerson, J., dissenting).
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York State to confer jurisdiction over him."227
Although LSI cannot be deemed to have been physically
present in New York, the exercise of jurisdiction over LSI,
and, by extension, the physician defendants, does not offend
due process. LSI purposefully availed itself of the benefits of
the forum state by the manner in which it projected itself
into New York. It had sufficient minimum contacts .... 228
Because Judge Dickerson found jurisdiction under CPLR section
302(a)(1), he then went into a due process analysis. Dickerson cited
to his Grimaldi decision and argued that "[s]o long as a party avails
itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts
with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its action there, due
process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even
if not 'present' in that state. ' 229 In order to provide some context,
we will discuss this holding in relation to Grimaldi v. Guinn.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: How Do WE ACCOUNT FOR THE
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE COURTS?
It appears that public policy weighed heavily on the Court's
decision in Paterno. The Court of Appeals unveiled its policy
concerns in one short paragraph in its 7-0 opinion.230 The Court
stated, given the reality that:
It is no longer unusual or difficult, as it may once have been,
to travel across state lines in order to obtain health care from
an out-of-state provider. It is also not unusual to expect
follow-up for out-of-state treatment. . . . [T]o find
defendants' conduct here constitutes transacting business
within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1), based on contacts
before and after the surgeries, would set a precedent for
227 Id. (quoting Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 167). Dickerson cited Grimaldi and quoted
Fischbarg to support his position that the contacts described above demonstrate the
'"purposeful creation of a continuing relationship' with the plaintiff." Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d
at 697 (Dickerson, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Dickerson bolstered his argument by
pointing out that "national markets for commercial trade, as well as technological advances in
communication, enable a party to transact enormous volumes of business within a state
without physically entering it." Id. at 694 (quoting Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 162).
Dickerson went on to say '"it is not necessarily who initiated contact that is determinative,
but rather, the nature and quality of the contacts and the relationship established as a
result."' Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (Dickerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Fischbarg v.
Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 28 (N.Y. 2007)) (emphasis added).
228 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (Dickerson, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 694 (quoting Grimaldi, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 162).
230 Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 989, 995 (N.Y. 2014).
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almost limitless jurisdiction over out-of-state medical
providers in future cases.231
The Court of Appeals was unwilling to interpret the expanse of
CPLR section 302(a)(1) to be boundless in its application. The
Court was concerned with the significant effects that an adverse
holding would entail.232 According to the New York Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Second Department, allowing plaintiffs to bring claims against
defendants similar to those in this case would open the "floodgates"
for out of state medical malpractice cases to be brought in New York
courts. 233 It appears that it was important to the court to protect
doctors all over the country from being called into New York State
courts. 234 People travel all over the country for medical treatment,
thus it appears that the Appellate Court and Court of Appeals did
not believe it would be fair for foreign doctors to be dragged to New
York to defend against claims that stemmed from conduct in foreign
states.
As a practical matter, New York State residents who are patients
in out-of-state clinics want to sue in New York State. There are
various reasons why people receive medical treatment in other
states: they may want to get surgery in a foreign state due to a
particular doctor's reputation, they may have relatives in a foreign
state, or they may simply want to get surgery in a warm-weather
state so that they can experience a more pleasant recovery by the
beach rather than in the cold.235 Regardless of the specific reason a
patient may have, there are countless explanations why people
travel out of state for medical treatment. However, while they may
choose to obtain medical services outside of New York, they will
likely still want to sue in New York, their home state, due to its
231 Id. at 995.
232 See id.
233 See id.; see generally Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (stating how just because an
individual suffers pain in a state, that does not mean they are entitled to sue a physician
based upon a procedure that occurred in another state). This would add to the 4,000 medical
malpractice cases already filed each year. See NY Courts to Focus More on Medical
Malpractice, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2011, 1:26 PM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111111/HEALTHCARE/111119970/ny-courts-to-
focus-more-on-medical-malpractice.
234 See Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
235 See, e.g., Amanda Gardner, 6 Million Americans Travel Abroad Each Year for
Surgeries, Medical Treatments, HEALTH (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://news.health.com/2009/04/O8/traveling-treatment/; Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Growing
Popularity of Having Surgery Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/the-growing-popularity-of-having-surgery-
overseas.html.
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convenience and its reputation for comparably large damage
awards. 236
According to previous Court of Appeals opinions, doctors treating
large numbers of New York State patients and advertising for them
using an active website may very well be held accountable in New
York State courts rather than in courts of their own foreign states.
That being said, it appears that a defendant medical clinic or doctor
who operates a passive website may not be held accountable in New
York State courts. In Paterno, it was significant for the Court that
defendants operated a passive website. 237 The other key point for
the Court was that the plaintiff initiated the contacts. 238 The
combination of the fact that the website was found to be passive and
the fact that the contact was initiated by the plaintiff led the Court
to find that advertising in the manner that LSI did would not lead
clinics to be accountable in New York State courts.23 9
Furthermore, while a Florida clinic may easily hire a New York
State lawyer who litigates for them while they remain afar, the
same is not necessarily true for the doctors. 240 It is significant that
236 See Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown: A State-by-State Report Card,
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (July 21, 2014),
http://www.epmonthly.com/departments/subspecialties/medico-legal/the-medical-malpractice-
rundown-a-state-by-state-report-card/ (stating that New York has frequent malpractice
litigation and high malpractice payouts); Dylan Scott, California and New Jersey Hospitals
Charge Highest Average Prices, GOVERNING (May 9, 2013),
http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-california-and-new-jersey-hospitals-charge-highest-
average-prices.html (showing New York placed 12th on a list ranking the 50 states average
provider charges and total hospital discharges by state for fiscal year 2011); see generally
THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBACEK, U.S. DEP'T JUST., NCJ 233094, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 10 (Mar. 2011) (proving the proposition that the
percentage of civil trials in state courts with litigants seeking punitive damages is higher in
New York than in some other states).
237 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The appellate court cited Zippo for the proposition that
the website was passive. See id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
238 Paterno, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 684; see also Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 993-
94 (N.Y. 2014) ("Plaintiff here admits that he was the party who sought out and initiated
contact with defendants after viewing LSI's website. According to plaintiff, that website
informed viewers about LSI medical services and its professional staff. However, he has not
asserted that it permitted direct interaction for online registration, or that it allowed for
online purchase of LSI services.... Passive websites, such as the LSI website, which merely
impart information without permitting a business transaction, are generally insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction .... Thus, as plaintiff concedes, the mere fact that he viewed
LSI's website in New York is insufficient to establish CPLR 302(a)(1) personal jurisdiction
over defendants." (citing Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895 N.Y.S.2d 156, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)))
(citations omitted).
239 See Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 993-94.
240 See Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 871, 872 (2010) (showing a survey of the reasons why people bring medical
malpractice cases).
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the defendants in this case were the LSI Institute and the
doctors.241 While a large institute like LSI may have the legal
resources to litigate in New York, doctors operating foreign,
boutique, private practices may not have the resources to hire New
York attorneys. 242  An additional policy consideration is that
evidence of an alleged malpractice claim resides in the foreign state,
where the injury occurred, not in New York. Further, the location
of witnesses in medical malpractice cases is generally in the foreign
state where the surgery occurred. It would be difficult for the
defendant to bring witnesses to New York State when the accident
occurred in another part of the country. 243 For these reasons, the
Court of Appeals was unwilling to open the "floodgates," as the
Court sought to protect professionals and restrict personal
jurisdiction to those who can be fairly reached.
VII. THE PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK OF CPLR 302(A)(1) AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATERNO DECISION
A. The Future Reach of CPLR 302(a)(1)
Many New Yorkers and other Americans travel to foreign states
seeking medical attention. 244 Is it fair for these New Yorkers who
241 See Paterno, 23 N.E.3d at 990 (naming the parties in the case).
242 See, e.g., Mary Brophy Marcus, Doctors Detail High Costs of Fighting Malpractice
Claims, U.S. News (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/news/articles/2 012/04/04/doctors-detail-high-costs -of-fighting-malpractice-claims
(stating the average malpractice claim costs $23,000 in legal defense fees).
243 See generally RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (N.Y. UNIFIED CT. SYS. 2013) (showing
the relevant considerations when trying to secure a witness to appear in court). There are
many statistics that focus on malpractice claims in New York. See, e.g., ARTHUR BEST &
DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 6 (2d ed. 2007) ('The
Harvard Medical Practice Study found that in New York State 'eight times as many patients
suffer an injury from medical negligence as there are malpractice claims. Because only about
half the claimants receive compensation, there are about sixteen times as many patients who
suffer an injury from negligence as there are persons who receive compensation through the
tort system.'
Although trials are the legal system's iconographic center, they also are its chief aberration.
Fewer than ten cases in one hundred proceed to trial. The great majority are resolved
through negotiated settlements. . . . Out of 10,000 actionable negligent injuries,
approximately 9600 disappeared when injury victims did not pursue a claim. Half of those
that were presented to attorney never became filed lawsuits. Of the 200 cases filed (2% of
those negligently injured), 170 will be settled, paying most plaintiffs less than their actual
losses. Trials will commence for about thirty of these cases. Of the 1,000,000 patients who
were not negligently injured, an estimated 2400 will mistakenly regard their injuries as
resulting from negligence, and about one third of those become filed lawsuits .... ").
244 See Gardner, supra note 235; Robert Pear, Medical Boards Draft Plan to Ease Path to
Out-of-State and Online Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/us/medical-boards- draft-plan- to-ease-path-to-out-of-state-
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live in New York and pay New York taxes not to seek justice for
medical malpractice in their own state, simply because they chose to
seek out-of-state medical treatment? What if these New Yorkers
chose to obtain medical treatment outside of New York for the
simple reason that they could not afford medical treatment in New
York State? Shouldn't New Yorkers, who pay New York taxes, own
property in New York and serve jury duty in New York, have access
to New York courts? People travel to a foreign states (and even
foreign countries) 245 for procedures that their health insurance
plans do not cover.246 In addition, patients travel because such
procedures may be less expensive out of New York State.247
According to data, patients should shop around for their medical
treatment.248 Hospitals can charge up to over four times the amount
of their counterparts in other states. 249 Medicare data shows that
facilities nationwide submitted divergent bills for the same
treatment.250 If a person travels out of state for medical treatment
that they would be unable to afford in the state of New York, it does
not seem convenient or fair, nor does it appear to be in the interest
of justice to prevent harmed New Yorkers from litigating in New
York courts. The judicial system should protect New York residents
by allowing them to have their day in court and litigate malpractice
claims in their home state.
and-online-treatment.html? r=l ("Officials representing state medical boards across the
country have drafted a model law that would make it much easier for doctors licensed in one
state to treat patients in other states, whether in person, by videoconference or online.").
245 See Gardner, supra note 235 (stating that approximately six million Americans travel
abroad each year for medical treatment and medical surgeries).
246 See Gardner, supra note 235 (describing how some patients even travel internationally
for medical treatment, where the cost of health care is less, combined with the fact that the
US has a shortage of physicians and nurses); Rosenthal, supra note 235.
247 See, e.g., 10 Most Expensive Hospitals in the U.S., MED. BILLING DEGREE,
http://www.medicalbillingdegree.org/10-most-expensive-hospitals-in-the-u-s/ (last visited Apr.
5, 2016) ("In the New York City area, a knee joint replacement may cost anywhere from
$15,000 to $155,000.").
248 See id. (stating how data shows every hospital charges a different amount for various
procedures so consumers should shop around before making a decision); see generally Julie
Creswell et al., New Jersey Hospital has Highest Billing Rates in the Nation, N.Y. TIMES (May
16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17lbusinesslbayonne-medical-center-has-highest-
us-billing-rates.html?hp&_r=l&%3Cbr%20/%0 3E (showing how one hospital charges more
than any other hospital in America).
249 Id.
250 Matthew Bloch et al., How Much Hospitals Charge for the Same Procedures, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/08[business/how-much-hospitals-
charge.html?ref=business.
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B. Did the Paterno Court get it Wrong?
We also need to look at the flipside of the argument. Other than
financial reasons, is it fair to confine New Yorker's to medical
treatment only provided in this state? Take for example Cancer
Centers of America, with locations in Georgia, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Oklahoma.2 51  For New Yorker's
seeking extensive treatment, shouldn't they be allowed to obtain
this service free of worrying about whether or not New York will
provide them a judicial remedy if required? Shouldn't states look
out for the overall health and well-being of their citizens?
The Court seems to be drawing lines in the sand with their
decision in Paterno.252 The Paterno Court was faced with the
potential issue of opening up the floodgates, but at the same time, a
court must balance the interests of the residents within the State of
New York that need protection and scrutinize the true quality and
nature of the contacts between the patient and doctors or medical
facilities, as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The New York State Court of Appeals decision in Paterno v. Laser
Spine Inc. failed to properly apply the correct statutory criteria in
its "totality of circumstances" analysis to determine if the
"transaction of business" clause in CPLR section 302(a)(1) had been
satisfied. The Paterno record clearly demonstrates the defendants
had an excessive quantity of contacts with New York State and that
the "quality and nature" of those contacts had a substantial
relationship to the plaintiffs cause of action.253 Also, the record
clearly shows the plaintiffs claims arose from the defendant's
contacts because there was an articulable nexus between those
contacts and the plaintiffs cause of action.254 The policy rational of
251 See, e.g., Our Hospitals, CANCER TREATMENT CTRS. AM.,
http://www.cancercenter.com/doctors-and-hospitals/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (showing
locations in Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Oklahoma).
252 See Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 995 (N.Y. 2014). There have been
recent cases citing Paterno. See, e.g., Wang v. LSUC, et al., No. 653250/13, 2016 WL 902292,
at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 10, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction and relying on Paterno); Stern v. Four Points by Sheraton Ann Arbor Hotel, 19
N.Y.S.3d 289, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Carrs v. Avco Corp., 2 N.Y.S.3d 533, 533 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015); Minella v. Restifo, 3 N.Y.S.3d 322, 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
253 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988 (2014)
(showing an example of the defendant's contacts in the forum state).
254 See id. at 23.
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preventing the opening of floodgates of medical malpractice
litigation by New Yorkers against doctors throughout the world
makes some sense but, as with every legal half-truth, it has its
limits. When non-domiciliary defendants have the number of
contacts committed by the defendants in Paterno and their claims
arise from those contacts, citizens of the Empire State should not be
deprived of access to our courts because of unnecessary fears of
opening the litigation flood gates by a logically expansive
application of the Empire States' long-arm statute.
